Embedsmændenes insiderhandel

Enhver læser Børsen ved, at insiderhandel – køb, salg og tilskyndelse til køb eller salg af et værdipapir af nogen, der har intern viden om papiret, som kan være af betydning for handlen – er forbudt. Ja, ifølge en ny (forkert, vil mange nok sige) byretsdom fra Holstebro udstrækker forbuddet sig endda til brug af ikke-privilegeret viden, som er erfaret på et åbent retsmøde.

Med insider-restriktionen i baghovedet kan man give sig i kast med working paper’et ”Stock Picking Skills of SEC Employees”, som den danske bankmand Lars Christensen, via sin blog, har henledt min opmærksomhed på. Artiklen indeholder en undersøgelse af, hvordan ansatte ved det amerikanske finanstilsyn selv handler. Her er fra artiklens abstract (min fremhævning):

“We use a new data set obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request to investigate the trading strategies of the employees of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We find that a hedge portfolio that goes long on SEC employees’ buys and short on SEC employees’ sells earns positive and economically significant abnormal returns of (i) about 4% per year for all securities in general; and (ii) about 8.5% in U.S. common stocks in particular. The abnormal returns stem not from the buys but from the sale of stock ahead of a decline in stock prices. We find that at least some of these SEC employee trading profits are information based, as they tend to divest (i) in the run-up to SEC enforcement actions; and (ii) in the interim period between a corporate insider’s paper-based filing of the sale of restricted stock with the SEC and the appearance of the electronic record of such sale online on EDGAR. These results raise questions about potential rent seeking activities of the regulator’s employees.”

Det er sprængfarlige sager, og som Lars så passende spørger: Hvem vogter egentlig vogterne?